Herbert Block's "Speak Loudly and Poke them with a Big Stick"A recent Harvard simulation of the next year of diplomatic wrangling over the Iranian nuclear program concluded with a startling result: Iran succeeded and in the process strained U.S. diplomatic relations with Europe, Russia, China and especially Israel.  In the scenario, which featured senior diplomats and academics role-played as various heads of state, the U.S. initially focused exclusively on implementing broad sanctions.  Iran ignored the sanctions entirely and continued its program apace.  Eventually, China and Russia balked at the sanctions and secretly offered to help Iran.  The U.S., realizing that it was incapable of stopping Iran diplomatically and unwilling to intervene militarily, decides to adopt a policy of containment based on its earlier experience in the Cold War.  Israel, however, refuses to accept a nuclear Iran and the U.S. threatens to publicly condemn an attack on Iran by Israel.  The game ends with Iran gaining strengthened ties to Russia and China, and hard break between Israel and Washington.

Noah Pollack's analysis of how that break might occur, suggests "a major effort by the administration to keep the Israelis, not the Iranians, in check":

It’s clear at this point that the Obama administration has reconciled itself to a nuclear Iran and even, I think, convinced itself that this won’t be such a bad thing. After all, China opened up to the West after it went nuclear. We dealt with the Russians after they went nuclear. The Indians and Pakistanis haven’t nuked each other, despite Kashmir and all the terrorism. Neither has Israel used nukes, for that matter.

The president is perfectly capable of muddling through the nuclearization of Iran. What would create huge problems is an Israeli strike. Obama would have to use the military to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. The “Arab street,” which he has worked so hard to befriend, would burn him in effigy from Algiers to Islamabad. The Zionist-Crusader axis would be denounced around the world. “Optics” are very important to Obama, quite more so than substance, and he would look as though he had completely lost control of the Middle East (which would be true). And once again, the world would descend into the kind of brutal struggle for power that is not supposed to happen during the Obama Era.

Netanyahu is not the Prime Minister Obama needs if he plans on soft pedalling on Iranian nukes and Obama isn't the President Netanyahu needs if he plans on going Operation Orchard in Iran.  Netanyahu was elected primarily because he is hard-nosed about Iran and Palestine and President McCain would have probably invaded Iran for Israel.  Despite the snark of Mr. Pollack's description of Obama and optics, accepting that the only country capable of stopping Iranian nuclear ascendancy is Iran is the only realistic option.  The best strategy would be to stop pursuing sanctions in favor of engaging Iran on as many diplomatic fronts as possible.  Gary Sick, the diplomat who led the Iranian team in the simulation, explained the possibilities of that approach:

Just as we largely ignored the ineffective pressure tactics originating from the US, our own words and vulnerabilities were equally ignored by most of the other players. Why did no one go back to the Iranian offer of a negotiating agenda presented in 2003? Or the more recent catalogue of issues introduced as part of the Geneva/Vienna meetings? The reason seems to be the all-consuming obsession with the nuclear issue and the apparent belief that Iran’s  words, in whatever form, are irrelevant. The nuclear issue is indeed important, but AfPak, Iraq, Hezbollah, Persian Gulf stability, etc. are also not to be dismissed out of hand. And Iran over the years has offered some interesting suggestions that have never been explored. Why not use the meetings with Iran to create some working groups to explore the possibility of progress on issues other than the nuclear one? By broadening our scope, we might actually improve the  environment for constructive work on the nuclear issue.

That should be the U.S. strategy on relations with all countries; engage as much as possible when vital interests are at stake, no matter how distasteful some aspects of the country are.  A realist conception of foreign policy is that all states are self-interested, not that they are necessarily participating in a dichotomy between good and evil.  The U.S. has interests in everything and so has many opportunities to constructively engage the countries it has contentious relationships with.  Iran could, and has at times, played an important role in stabilizing Afghanistan for example.  The impotent histrionics directed at any country that we disagree with only makes it less likely that common ground can be reached.  I am reminded of the condemnation thrown Russia's way during its invasion of Georgia, even though there was absolutely nothing anyone could or would do about it.  Russia remains one of the most strategically important countries in the world and we soured relations without substantially improving the situation for Georgia.  Measured responses allow graceful reconciliation, empty bluster invites rogue behavior. 

Teddy Roosevelt said: speak softly and carry a big stick.  After years of shouting so that no one with notice our twig, it might be time to use our inside voices if we want to avoid a tough year in Tel-Aviv and D.C.