A New Plan for Afghanistan

our newest allies?Today, world leaders, including Hamid Karzai, are meeting in London to shape a plan for reintegrating the Taliban into Afghan society.  Al-Jazeera reports that a $1 billion fund for luring Taliban fighters away is being gathered from contributions from Japan, the U.S. and the U.K.  The tactic hopes reintegrate that milder elements of the Taliban in Afghan society with the promise of new jobs focusing on infrastructure and rural development.  This is an important step that the Inductive has advocated in the past.  

Rather than an indication on failure from the Afghan Surge, the new plan could serve as a turning point in the war effort.  Incorporating economic development and cooperation with certain elements of the Taliban should be viewed as the logical next step of the renewed focus on counterinsurgency.  After the recent Afghan elections, it became clear that Karzai's corrupt government would have a tough time trying to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.  The incorruptible Taliban established some amount of legitimacy for their rival government in Afghanistan's rural and tribal areas.

Nevertheless, NATO has stuck with Karzai, who despite his shady reelection will remain the figurehead of future NATO endeavors in Afghanistan.  Before this new strategy was considered, the war effort appeared in gridlock, with the Kabul government unable to impose its social contract on the rural tribes.  A new plan focusing on infrastructure and cooperation with rural respresentatives of the Taliban offers a degree of federalism, self-rule, and economic development in exchange for the legitimacy of the Karzai government.  It is a win-win situation for all parties but the more extreme members of the Taliban.  

Going forward, it's important that the new plan be seen not as a bribe, but a justified incorporation of Afghanistan citizens into the expanded state.  Afghanistan politics during war are often fluid, which defections common as the outcome becomes apparent.  Allowing rural Afghans, who frequently owe allegiance to tribes rather than national movements, to participate in reconstruction makes the job easier for U.S. troops and greatly assists efforts at nation building.  Simply putting the country on the dole will not create institutional support, only zombies reanimated by foreign largess.  This balancing act will require considerable efforts from all parties: the Kabul government must appear legitimate and be willing to delegate authority to the provinces; NATO must fully endorse the plan and deliver on its promises of immunity to Taliban defectors while remaining vigilant to the possibility of double-agents; and Taliban defectors must make clear commitments to the Kabul based government. 

Such a strategy will doubtlessly prompt a reaction from the Taliban leadership including reprisals against defectors, though losing regional strength might only force them to retrench in strongholds.  Ensuring the safety of those who change sides will be tricky, but improving the security situation is an important hallmark of the success of a counter-insurgency campaign.  The incremental progress towards a safe and independent Afghanistan that might be ten or more years away has been strengthen by this new strategy.  The Taliban rank-and-file do not deserve punishment for September 11th and working with them does not make us less secure.  Seperating the sharks from the minnows allows NATO to focus on both bringing terrorists and destabilizing actors to justice, making the region and the world safer.